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Copyright law originated in the 18th century1 and it is regarded as an important
cornerstone of successful intellectual property protection. However, recently it
has been criticised strongly. Particularly its extensions to now over 100 years
granted by U.S. Congress { and followed by other legislations { are widely seen
as simply bad policy that misses out on the original intention of promoting the
\progress of science and of useful arts" by granting a temporary monopoly.
Moreover, modern information and communication technology makes it in-
creasingly di±cult to actually protect the copyright of a digital good. Illicit
copies of music ¯les reach billions per year and there seems to be no way to stop
the peer-to-peer ¯le trading with reasonable means.
Doubts about its appropriate design and its enforceability bring up the ques-
tion whether copyright law is still an adequate governance system for intellectual
property rights in the digital age. Are there alternative ways of providing in-
formation goods, a more e±cient eco-system for ideas than the one copyright
law o®ers? Modi¯ed copyright structures2 give content creators more °exibility
compared to the strict copyright law. But why should content creators use them
instead of strong protection of their rights, essentially giving up on something
that has been granted to them by law?
Once created, the reproduction (or copying) of a digital good does not cost
any additional resources. Its distribution is also virtually costless. Therefore,
marginal costs of digital goods are practically zero. They have public goods
characteristics: they are non-rival and non-excludable.
However, Pareto-e±cient pricing according to p=MC is not su±cient for
rewarding artists for their work, so that at least their basic reservation costs are
covered. Otherwise, there would be no motivation to create in the ¯rst place.
Social preferences based on fair and reciprocal behaviour might o®er such an
alternative. The ¯nancial reward for the artists is based on a su±ciently high
number of fair-minded consumers who contribute voluntarily (if they enjoy the
product). The "contract" between the artist and the consumers of his products
relies on a trust-based relationship. In fact, fairness and reciprocity might be
regarded as the enforcement device of a deliberately left open contract. Such
voluntary contributions for information goods can in fact be observed in reality.
Takeyama (1994a) studies shareware software and Regner (2004) analyses the
tipping behaviour in the Internet service Google Answers. It can be theoretically
explained by social preferences models and numerous lab experiments generally
con¯rm other-regarding behaviour. Fehr and Schmidt (2000), Charness and
Rabin (2002) and Camerer (2003) give an overview of the literature.
We apply these two insights { information goods have public goods proper-
ties; social preferences are signi¯cant among individuals { to examine what type
of contracts are e±cient in the digital age. Our tool of analysis is contract the-
ory. Instead of the standard Principal-Agent-situation with a ¯rm and a worker
1It was ¯rst enacted in England with the statute of Anne (1709) and then in 1787 as part
of the U.S. constitution.
2The Creative Commons license, for instance. See: www.creativecommons.org
2in the labour market, our model features the copyright holder and consumers in
information goods markets with uncertainty about the payment. We examine
three di®erent contract scenarios under asymmetric information and analyse the
respective private investment incentives and social welfare implications.
The goals of this paper are twofold. It aims to contribute to the quest for
an e±cient intellectual property rights environment for information goods. We
pursue this from a contract theory perspective. Moreover, we want to add an
interesting application to the ¯eld of behavioural economics.
Our main ¯nding is that endogenous incomplete contracts may achieve a
¯rst-best allocation of information goods, while complete contracts are limited
to second-best results. Moreover, any contract design can generate the highest
pro¯ts. Strong copy protection is not necessary for that.
Our paper contributes tothe literature on copyright. This strand of economic
research started with the ¯rst formal analysis of copyright by Plant (1934) who
in fact rejected the case for copyright mainly on the grounds of a su±cient ¯rst
mover advantage to establish the product. Landes and Posner (1989) and Be-
sen and Kirby (1989) are main papers with a general welfare approach. Other
important works deal with speci¯c aspects of copying. Liebowitz (1985) es-
tablished the concept of indirect appropriability, Takeyama (1994b) analyses
positive network e®ects from unauthorised copies and Varian (2000) examines
the sharing of information goods. Watt (2000) o®ers an excellent survey of the
literature as a whole.
We particularly consider the welfare e®ects of copyright for digital content.
One recent paper { Yoon (2002) { speci¯es the optimal level of copyright pro-
tection in the light of widespread digital copies. However, they do not take
maintenance costs of the copyright system into account as we do. Varian (2004)
analyses the problem of sharing as well, but he assumes a ¯xed number of con-
sumers and homogeneous valuation of the product. Moreover, we consider the
option of voluntary contributions, a relaxed copyright regime.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the economic
context of the paper. It gives a brief overview of the three strands of the
economic theory we relate to: information economics, behavioural economics
and contract theory. Section 3 sets up the basic model and derives the main
results. We present some open aspects for future research and conclude in
section 5.
2 Economic Context
2.1 Information Goods and Welfare Economics
Much has been written about the New Economy and the revolutionary e®ects of
information technology on the economy. Much has also been put in perspective
by serious accounts like Shapiro and Varian (1999), for example. However, one
thing that indeed is about to change on the way to an informational society is
3the emergence of a number of goods { digital information goods3 { that rarely
existed before. Computer software, digital music or electronic-books for instance
are products of the informational society and their attribute of zero marginal
costs of reproduction gives them public goods properties.4 The use of one digital
copy does not diminish the value of any other digital copy. Moreover, potential
users can hardly be excluded from consumption.5
Generally welfare economics calls for perfect market competition as this
achieves optimal allocation of resources, however under certain hypotheses.
These assumptions can { by and large { be expected to hold for many products
of our economy. This is particularly true { and especially relevant in our case
{ for very homogenous products like books or music CDs. However, the transi-
tion from physical to digital information goods a®ects these basic assumptions.
The appropriability of digital goods is seriously in question and they cannot be
regarded as private goods anymore.
If we then ask the classic question of welfare economics again for digital
goods, the answer will not be so clearly in favour of perfect market competi-
tion. Arrow (1962) analysed the welfare implications related to the production
of knowledge. He shows that a free enterprise economy will under-invest in re-
search, because the product can be appropriated only to a limited extent. The
price set by the market will exceed the socially optimal one of zero marginal
costs, one that would make everybody bene¯t from the research. He concludes
that for optimal allocation to invention some organisation not governed by the
pro¯t-and-loss criteria { an alternative to the free market - needs to fund re-
search.
Until recently research and its production of knowledge used to be the only
commodity that matched the characteristics of a digital good, of course being in
fact the quintessential information good. As described earlier the New Economy
introduces some products either entirely new as software or transformed from
physical goods like digital music or e-books; all of them are digital information
goods, though.
It is important to stress again the di®erence between physical and digital
information goods in terms of the property rights governance here. While our
property rights system is designed for physical goods { correctly and with a lot
of success { digital goods require a more nuanced property rights environment
3We will also call them digital goods or weightless goods as in related literature, but will
focus on the term information goods. When necessary we distinguish them from physical
information goods (information attached to a physical medium, e.g. a CD) by calling them
digital information goods. When the sense is obviouswe only use the term information goods.
Following Quah (2003) they are distinguished from other goods by ¯ve characteristics: digital
goods are non-rival, in¯nitely expansible, discrete, aspatial and recombinant. More examples
include videogames, DNA sequences, news, recipes, sports scores, visual images.
4Non-rival and non-excludable.
5Peer-to-peer ¯le sharing networks provide the online community with a huge amount of
¯les for free (among them copyrighted music and movie ¯les). The case of Napster is well-
known. However, o®shoots that emerged after its demise work without a central ¯le server
and also exchange a great number of legal ¯les. Recently a court ruled in favour of two
online services and for the ¯rst time against the Recording Industry Association of America,
recognising the legality of P2P services in a way. See Richtel (2003).
4to encourage a socially e±cient allocation. This system change appears par-
ticularly di±cult to understand for physical information goods that have been
°ourishing under ordinary property rights, but metamorphosed into digital in-
formation goods in the New Economy.
A number of digital goods are already being given away for free: E-books,
open source software or computer shareware. However, this can generally be
explained with positive promotional network e®ects that increase revenue indi-
rectly and/or a production that is primarily for personal use.
Some authors explicitly o®er their e-books for free. The rationale here is a
positive word of mouth e®ect (a network externality) that increases the actual
sales of the real book, the physical information good. The promotion e®ect
is signi¯cant and free downloads are massive.6 What makes this work is the
quality di®erence between the e-book and an ordinary book. They can be
regarded as complements, because the reading experience of a real book is so
much better than reading the e-book on a screen. People with a high enough
quality preference will buy the real book after getting to know it as a free e-
book. Voluntary donations are not really intended here as they would bypass
the publisher who is required for book production.
Contributions of code to open source software are intrinsically motivated.
Non-academic literature mentions entertainment, challenge and social ties as
the main motivation for programmers (Torvalds (2001)). Economically it can
be explained with peer recognition concerns and potential lucrative jobs in the
future if the coding is successful (Lerner and Tirole (2002)).
Most computer shareware is programmed out of personal motivation: work-
ing out a better way for a simple speci¯c software problem the coder encoun-
tered. Giving the software away for free supports the public domain with no
additional costs. Takeyama (1994a) presents an empirical study of the share-
ware industry. The software is distributed under a voluntary payment scheme.
The main ¯nding of the paper is that the distribution of returns has a positive
expected value even when development costs (time) are considered. Therefore,
potential voluntary contributions can make it worthwhile to program shareware.
The aforementioned reasons do not particularly apply to music products.
The negligible quality di®erence between conventional music products (CDs)
and digital music (MP3s) makes them rather substitutes and not complements
(as e-books are to real books). Positive network e®ects of free digital music can
not be expected to have a signi¯cant positive e®ect on traditional sales, at least
not in the long run. Moreover, making music is rather aimed at entertaining
other people. It is not mainly for a personal purpose as computer shareware
often is (initially).
However, voluntary contributions from consumers like in the case of share-
ware might provide an alternative reward system to justify giving away music
for free.
6Cory Doctorow's novel "Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom" at
http://www.craphound.com/down/
52.2 Contract Theory Framework
Our model framework is set in contract theory, with the copyright holder of
an information good as the principal and a consumer as the agent. Standard
contract theory (as in models for the labour market with a ¯rm/manager as
principal and a worker as the agent) deals with asymmetric information. The
action the agent takes (e.g. e®ort) usually a®ects the output, but cannot be con-
tracted on. The output, which is determined by e®ort and some randomness,
is used to write a contract to create incentives and make the agent exert opti-
mal e®ort. In our setting there is no production function with a randomness
term involved. Information asymmetry causes non-contractibility of the pay-
ment, not of an e®ort. This makes our principal agent situation somewhat more
straightforward. The principal contracts directly on the action of the agent - if
he is able to observe and verify the action, that is.
The simple relationship between copyright holder and consumer is based on
the principal contracting with the agent to make a payment in exchange for the
utility of consuming the music. We will see that this contractual relationship is
very trivial for physical music goods (CDs), but far from that for "weightless"
music (downloads).
Moreover, we integrate insights from the incomplete contracts literature in
our framework. We compare complete contracts that specify all aspects of the
relationship with contracts that are deliberately much less de¯ned. These en-
dogenous incomplete contracts encourage reciprocal fair behaviour of socially
minded agents. Fehr, GÄ achter, Kirchsteiger (1997) conduct labour market ex-
periments with ¯rms and workers. Three contracts are simulated that di®er in
the degree of incompleteness. E®ort levels of workers were signi¯cantly higher
in the treatment with the least de¯ned contract. The contract that gives the
opportunity for mutual reciprocity was found to improve e±ciency.
Later Fehr and Schmidt (2000) apply their model of inequity aversion to
a similar experiment featuring a manager as principal and a worker as agent.
Contrary to the prediction of the self-interest hypothesis incomplete contracts
are o®ered { in fact they are preferred { by the principals and reach a higher
e®ort level than complete contracts.7
Regner (2004) is another empirical analysis of endogenous incomplete con-
tracts. The contract choices in a digital content labour relationship are analysed
in a natural experiment.
2.3 Social Preferences
Social preferences explain economic behaviour movingaway from the self-interest
hypothesis of neoclassic economics. This departure is based on the results of
a vast number of experiments conducted in recent years (see the surveys of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Camerer (2003)). However, the concept of so-
cial preferences goes back to the very beginning of modern economics { in fact,
7A more detailed description and analysis of the experiment can be found in Fehr, Klein,
Schmidt (2001)
6literally even beyond that. Adam Smith already stressed the importance of
other-regarding preferences in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments".
Without a doubt economic motivation by self-interest does play a major
role. The self-interest hypothesis can accurately explain economic behaviour
in many areas. Predictions are particularly ¯ne the more competitive markets
are and the more homogenous goods are. This is also con¯rmed by experi-
ments (Smith (1962)). On the other hand, many economic transactions are not
about standardised goods and they are not taking place in a competitive mar-
ket environment. The more personal the exchange is, the more other-regarding
behaviour matters (see Smith (1998) and also Fehr and Schmidt (1999)).
Therefore, social preferences "assume people are self-interested, but are also
concerned about the payo®s of others." (Charness and Rabin (2002))
Several formal models have been developed recently to describe the role of
fairness and reciprocity. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) both use inequity aversion to explain other-regarding behaviour. Models
of intention-based reciprocity like Rabin (1993) or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) focus on the intentions of other agents and its impact on behaviour.
Social preferences in Charness and Rabin (2002) combine the existing theory
strands and contain three di®erent motivations: a di®erence aversion component
(agents want to reduce di®erences between their and others' payo®s), concerns
for social welfare (agents like to increase social surplus not just their private
one) and a reciprocity part (a desire to raise or lower others' payo®s depending
on how nice or not these behaved). The data of Charness and Rabin (2002)
comes from 29 di®erent games with 467 participants, making 1697 decisions.
Their main goal is to get a better understanding of social motivations and its
di®erent types in order to improve formal models that explain social preferences.
From the statistical analysis of the experimental results they conclude that
all three types are signi¯cant, however to a di®erent extent. Social-welfare
preferences appear to be the most dominant factor, followed by reciprocity and
then di®erence aversion. While we do not want to discuss speci¯c details of
their experiments, one of the results deserves particular spotlight in the context
of our paper.
In game Barc7 player A can forgo a (750 for A, 0 for B) outcome to give
player B the choice between (750, 400) and (400, 400). Only 6% of theB's choose
(400, 400) here, while 30% of B's choose this option in the control game when
B's choice follows either no move or a nasty move of player A. CR conclude the
reason for this might be a very strong form of positive reciprocity compared with
di®erence aversion. They conjecture that agents who have just been treated very
kindly will not take Pareto-damaging action just to equalize payo®s. They also
stress the resemblance to real world situations of this particular game. Although
this is the result of just one game and more research needs to be conducted, the
relevance of this result to our setting is interesting as will be shown in the next
section.
73 The Model
The model describes the relationship between a copyright holder and a consumer
from the perspective of contract theory. We consider the transition process
from a traditional music industry with physical goods to a music industry in
the New Economy featuring digital goods. Therefore, we distinguish between
four di®erent contract cases.
The music market with physical goods allows for complete contracts. The
transaction process of getting the product and paying for it is observable and
enforceable.
In the digital age of information goods this transaction process becomes dif-
¯cult to observe and we move to a world of asymmetric information. Principals
can a) charge a monopolistic price and use strong copy protection to enforce the
payment or b) strategically reduce the price to compete with pirated copies or
c) o®er incomplete contracts that encourage reciprocal behaviour and voluntary
contributions.
3.1 Set up of the model
Our simple principal agent model describes the relationship between a copyright
holder H and a consumer C. The utility u to the consumer is his pleasure from
listening to the music. How much utility he gets depends on each consumer
as their preferences are heterogeneous. The payment to the copyright holder
is denoted as p. In complete contracts this payment is equal to the price the
copyright holder sets, whereas it can be zero under asymmetric information
when piracy occurs. However, pirated copies cause some disutility d to the
consumers as they might be inconvenient to get and bear the risk of a virus
attack. Finally, in incomplete contracts there is no price but instead possibly a
voluntary contribution v that C can make.
Under asymmetric information H has the option of implementing a moni-
toring scheme, which causes compliance costs K > 0. This scheme increases
the probability of the agent being convicted of copyright infringement from 0 to
s. Getting caught as a pirate means a ¯nancial and moral damage of f for the
agent as a result from government prosecution. Without a monitoring system
in place piracy is impossible to observe and the government cannot take action.
We assume both principal and agent to be risk-neutral. The participation
constraint of the agent is u ¸ p. The principal has to invest resources (time,
money) to create the good. He has alternative sources of income and therefore
we denote his investment as his reservation costs R.8
After analysing the di®erent contract cases we turn to the market for the
music good, which is modelled as a two-stage game: one for production, one for
consumption. The principal incurs the ¯xed costs (R and possibly K) in stage
1 and has to decide whether to produce the information good or not. In stage
2 the good is priced and consumed. The pricing is derived from the di®erent
8In the related literature this term is also known as the cost of expression (Landes and
Posner (1989) or the ¯xed cost of development (Yoon (2002)).
8contract designs. The costs incurred in stage 1 are sunk and will be ignored in
the second stage. A private incentives and social welfare analysis follow.
3.2 The Question of First-Best
Before analysing the four contract variations of the model, we want to focus
attention for a moment on the general benchmark of a ¯rst best world.
In standard contract theory there exists a certain level of agent action (ef-
fort of a worker, for instance) that maximises total surplus. If information is
symmetric, complete contracts can be written to obtain the ¯rst best. Under
information asymmetry though, agency costs arise and the optimal contract can
only induce the agent to exert e®ort on a second best level. This logic naturally
applies to the physical goods of the traditional music industry. Similar to the
trade o® between incentives and risk that reduces the e®ort of a worker or the
costly monitoring scheme that keeps e®ort at a certain level, the costs of the
product would increase, if the payment transaction were not observable and
action to enforce paying had to be taken.
However, the ¯rst best criterion in markets for digital information goods
is di®erent. Remember that an additional copy can be produced at negligible
costs; the marginal costs are zero. In the ¯rst best world the price would equal
marginal costs as this maximises total surplus. We still have to consider the
issue of dynamic e±ciency { motivation to produce information goods in the
¯rst place (when there is no price charged) { but it is already clear that under
information asymmetry a positive price cannot lead to a ¯rst best allocation of
the information good, only to a second best.
Again, complete contracts { imaginable under perfect information, though
not realistic { deliver ¯rst-best results as they would allow perfect ¯rst-degree
price discrimination.
3.3 Contract Designs
3.3.1 Physical Information Goods
Under perfect, symmetric information about the payment complete contracts
can be written in the traditional music environment. The analysis under com-
plete contracts is very straightforward and mainly serves for a better under-
standing of the bigger picture.
In this situation the principal H has a constant but positive cost of produc-
tion c. Remember that the physical good is not costless to reproduce in contrast
to the digital good. We abstract from occasional shoplifting and assume that
the agent's action of paying for the product is perfectly observable. Thus, a
complete and easily enforceable contract can be written.9
The market allocation under perfect competition with explicit contracts
would deliver ¯rst best results for physical goods. In reality the traditional
music industry is a rather concentrated market in which the ¯ve biggest ¯rms
9enabled by the well-working property rights system.
9(the major labels Universal, Time Warner, EMI and Sony and BMG who have
agreed to merge) combine for around 80% of the market share. In fact, they
were even found to collude on prices for CDs in the USA recently.10 Monopo-
listic price setting appears fair to assume in the industry. The condition for the
optimal contract is in°uenced by the market power and thus deviates from the
e±cient case of p = c that would otherwise be possible.
3.3.2 Digital Information Goods
The following three cases describe the music business in the New Economy.
The implications of this transition for the model are twofold: physical (c > 0)
convert to digital information goods (c = 0) and perfect information (certainty
about payment) is followed by asymmetric information with uncertainty about
receiving the charged price.
The copyright holder does not possess the means to observe the transaction
of the good as easily as he used to do in the traditional industry. He becomes
the principal and faces a situation of moral hazard as consumers now have the
alternative of ¯le sharing. They can obtain the digital good without paying for
it. The agents' payment for the principal's product becomes non-veri¯able.
Strong Copy Protection Pirated music is widely available in ¯le sharing
networks and consumers can download songs for free. The copyright holder
cannot contract on the payment. However, the principal can introduce what
is known in the literature (see for example Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo
(2001)) as a veri¯cation technology. He implements a monitoring system that
helps to detect consumers who do not pay, but rather use the P2P software.
This investment in veri¯cation technology makes copying veri¯able at a certain
probability s. To simplify things we assume that this signal (being caught)
is perfect and always results in litigation of the agent in court for copyright
infringement.11 The punishment f is exogenous as it is set by legislation.12
However, it is supposed to work as a threat only as it should keep the agent from
pirating. At the optimal price the agent chooses to buy the product, since the
risk of getting caught when copying is too high for him. The agent alsotakes into
account that copying causes transaction costs. The quality of the downloaded
music ¯le cannot be veri¯ed before and it might be a bad recording. As a result
the user might want to get another pirate copy. This is time-consuming and
his inconvenience increases. The downloader also runs the risk of getting a ¯le
10More information about this case and the settlement is available at
http://www.musiccdsettlement.com/english/
11The ¯rst direct legal action against individuals was a lawsuit of the Recording Industry
Association of America against four college students who were running \mini-Napsters" or
online directories on their computers, facilitating ¯le sharing for fellow students on the uni-
versity network. See Harmon (2003). In the meantime over 2,000 consumers have been taken
to court by record company associations.
12We assume thatthe ¯ne hasto be paid tothe government. This could be di®erent forcivil
lawsuits. However, a business model based on suing consumers is not an option for copyright
holders.
10that is infected with a virus and which might in turn damage his computer.
Moreover, one could also think of moral burdens that come with something
not exactly approved by society. We aggregate these transaction costs in the
disutility from copying d, which is constant over individuals.
Naturally, it is costly to implement the veri¯cation system. The huge tra±c
of P2P networks needs to be monitored and tracked which is technologically
very demanding.13 Also the identity of online users has to be revealed by the
internet service provider which poses some legal complications.14 We denote
the ¯xed cost of implementing a monitoring system as the compliance costs K.
Payo®s are (using a single, representative consumer and without sunk costs):
¦H = p and ¦C = u ¡ p if p · sf + d (1)
and
¦H = 0 and ¦C = u ¡ sf ¡ d if p > sf + d (2)
If the threat of the punishment is meant to work, the principal must set
a price lower or equal to the expected damage to the agent plus the disutility
from copying. Instead, the agent chooses to copy, when the price she is charged
exceeds the risk of getting punished.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the agent is: pmon · sf + d
Strategically Low Pricing Another option for the principal is to accept the
fact that digital copies of the product are readily available through ¯le-sharing
P2P networks. Illicit copying is tolerated and not actively prosecuted. Instead
he competes with pirated copies by setting a low price. It follows that the
principal does not invest in the monitoring system and no compliance costs
occur.
Although pirated copies are for free, they do cause some costs for the con-
sumers. Notice that the quality of consumption is equal no matter if it is a
direct copy or pirate copy. It is the transaction cost that is di®erent, though.
As explained above we aggregate these transaction costs in the disutility from
copying d, which is constant over individuals.
All these costs for the consumer occur if the product comes from piracy,
they do not if the product comes directly from the principal. Thus, a reasonable
strategy for the principal would be to take advantage of this utility di®erence
and o®er the product for a very low price that matches the consumer's disutility
from copying { as long as this still covers his reservation costs. The pricing
13The music industry is very active to develop electronic countermeasures against online
piracy; some of them legal, some illegal. See Sorkin (2003) and also Wired (2003)
14The Recording Industry Association ofAmericais in a legal battle with Verizon { amajor
internet service provider. It claims recent legislation obligates Verizon to reveal the names of
customers if they are suspected of infringement. Verizon argues the law violates free-speech
and due-processrightsprotected by the Constitution. See New York Times(2003). Recently a
Canadian courtruled thatinternetservice providers are notrequired topass on user identities.
See P2Pnet (2004).
11should be so attractive that buying the high quality product is more convenient
than getting a low quality copy for free.15
The copyright holder cannot charge more than the monetary equivalent of
the disutility from copying. Otherwise, the consumer will opt to pirate music
instead of buying it legally.
Payo®s are:
¦H = p and ¦C = u ¡ p if p · d (3)
and
¦H = 0 and ¦C = u ¡ d if p > d (4)
The incentive compatibility constraint is: plow · d
This contract gives the copyright holder a pro¯t equivalent to d. The con-
sumer gets a utility of u ¡ d, which is equal to his reservation utility from
copying.
Voluntary Reciprocal Contributions Finally, the principal can o®er the
product for free relying on enough voluntary contributions motivated by con-
sumers' social preferences that cover or exceed his reservation costs. It seems
important to stress again that only because of the particular characteristics of
digital information goods he has this choice. This could not work with physical
goods since giving these away is costly, giving away digital goods is not.
In contrast to a complete contract a deliberately left-open contract leaves
room for reciprocal behaviour between the agents.
The fact that the principal o®ers the product for free { despite other options
{ is regarded as kind behaviour in the eyes of the consumer.16 A fair-minded
consumer { one with social preferences { will recognise and appreciate the e®ort
of the principal and will reciprocate. He contributes voluntarily. Obviously, he
will only give a fraction of his actual utility from the song and he will certainly
not contribute, if he ¯nds out he does not like the music at all. On the other
hand, a sel¯sh consumer does not care about the income of the principal nor
about any kind behaviour towards him. He does not contribute and free rides.
In the literature of behavioural economics usually a ratio of 60% sel¯sh to
40% fair-minded individuals is assumed (Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Charness
15The iTunesMusic Store run by Apple Inc. appears to follow this strategy. It o®ers music
downloads fora moderate price and withoutusage restrictions. It hasbeen the ¯rstsuccessful
online music store and has already been imitated. See www.itunes.com
16Itis important to pointout that this only appliesto genuinely free products. When a free
version ismeant to boost the revenues from complementary products instead (as described in
section 2.1), consumers will have much less sympathy with the principal if at all. Consumers
who realise that the product is nothing but a loss-leader will not perceive the principal's free
o®fering as a kind gesture.
The same is true for consumers. We assume they are genuinely kind. They give a voluntary
contribution and do not spread the ¯le in P2P networks (which could be seen as unkind
behaviour).
Anotherway to look at thisisthatconsumers do not care fromwhere they got a music ¯le.
Once they enjoy it and are willing to reciprocate, they do not mind if they gotitdirectly from
the artist or via a P2P network. It is then bene¯cial for the principal, if consumers spread
the ¯le.
12and Rabin (2002)). We adopt this measure and denote the ratio of individuals
with social preferences as ﬁ.
However, experiments suggest that reciprocal behaviour of individuals is
even stronger when the amount of e®ort involved in the relationship (known as
"earned property rights" (Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000), V. Smith (1998) among
others) is taken into account. Experimental subjects are asked to do some
trivial extra work to earn their endowment. This is common knowledge among
the subjects. The results show that individuals appear to acknowledge when the
other party had to work for the endowment and they send more money back.
In the same way consumers know that artists have put in e®ort to provide the
information good. Moreover, the social, personal transaction between the artist
and a consumer instead of an impersonal market exchange with a record label
matters, if the copyright holder is the artist (V. Smith (1998)).
These factors a®ect the willingness of individuals to reciprocate and we sum
them up in the parameter ‚.
There is one more reason why an ex post payment for music (a voluntary
contribution) could be preferred to the common ex ante payment (the charged
price). Information goods are experience goods. Consumers do not know what
they are worth to them until they experience them (Shapiro and Varian (1999)).
Their exact value to the consumer is quite unknown ex ante. The valuation
rather develops until the good has been experienced often enough and the true
worth has been established.
This generally applies to information goods, but to music in particular. Lis-
tening to one song is much more likely to be a frequently repeated activity in
contrast to watching one movie. Often people realise how much they like a cer-
tain song only after quite some time. Moreover, the volatility of quality matters.
For instance, the quality of a newspaper will be rather stable over time and thus
people do not mind paying for it in advance. Quality of the output of an artist
is more likely to change over time or it might appeal to di®erent groups of con-
sumers. Finally, well-established artists can ask for ex ante payments thanks to
their reputation. On the other hand, ex post payments might be more inter-
esting to new artists who have not built a reputation yet. Thus, the expected
utility or the marginal willingness to pay ex ante can be signi¯cantly lower than
utility ex post.
In order to incorporate social preferences in this context we focus on reci-
procity. As mentioned before other motivations of socially minded individuals
exist - like concerns for social welfare and inequity aversion - and they have
also been expressed in theoretical models. However, describing the true cause
of social preferences is not the aim of this paper. Furthermore, we believe that
reciprocity plays a major role in the context of our model. That is why we limit
socially minded behaviour to reciprocity.
We integrate reciprocity based on the seminal work of Rabin (1993) for
normal form games and its extension Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for
extended form games. The utility function of socially minded individuals in-
creases not only in their material payo®s but also in the psychological payo®s
which depend on the individuals' kindness to others and beliefs about that.
13The resulting games are solved using the psychological games framework of
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). While the action set ai describes
the choices of player i (e.g. the selected contract design of the copyright holder
or the payment decision of the consumer), bij de¯nes the belief of i about the
choices of player j; whereas ciji is i's belief about what j believes are i's choices.
This framework of beliefs allows us to express the kindness •ij and beliefs about
the kindness e •iji of individuals towards another individual which are then in-
tegrated into the utility function of individuals with social preferences. This
concept has been applied and described in detail in Regner (2004) for a similar
digital content framework.
The adjusted utility function contains a material payo® as the ¯rst term and
the reciprocity payo® in the second term that is weighted by the sensitivity of
reciprocity ﬁ (ﬁ = 0 is the special case of pure self-interest).
Uc = ¦c(ac;bch) + ﬁ ¢•ch(ac;bch) ¢ e •chc(bch;cchc) (5)
The "material payo®" of the consumer is the pleasure u from listening to
the music minus what he pays to the copyright holder. For instance ¦c =
u ¡ p if a price is charged and paid. ¦c = u if the download is available
for free and the consumer does not give a voluntary contribution (free rides).
The material payo® is ¦c = u ¡ v if the consumer decides to give a voluntary
contribution. Only the case of the endogenous incomplete contract without a
¯xed price is interesting for our analysis. That means the copyright holder is
kind to the consumers. He could have set a price and enforced it, but instead
he opted to make the music freely available. This perceived kindness of H to C
is expressed by a positive value of e •chc. It would be negative, if H were unkind
and had charged a price instead. In the same way the kindness of the consumer
towards the copyright holder •ch takes a positive value, if C makes a voluntary
contribution to H. If the consumer free rides, he is unkind and •ch < 0. It
follows that the reciprocity payo® is positive, when the perceived kindness of
H is answered with kindness by C. It is also positive, if H is believed to be
unkind and then C is unkind, too. Essentially utility is increased by reciprocity
when the sign of an individual's kindness • matches the sign of the perceived
kindness of the other individual (e •).
Of course, in the case of purely self-interested individuals (ﬁ = 0) this has
no impact on the utility of the consumer. However, socially minded consumers
will wish to treat H kindly, if their preference for fairness ("bought" with the
voluntary contribution v) o®sets their material loss of being kind (paying v). If
this trade o® is not strong enough, material pursuits override fairness concerns
even if individuals have social preferences. The consumers' decision to make a
voluntary contribution depends on:
Uv
c = (u ¡ v) + ﬁ ¢ •v
ch ¢ e •
V C
chc > u + ﬁ ¢•ch ¢ e •
V C
chc = Uc (6)
The perceived kindness of H is e •
V C
chc and it is positive, because H has chosen
the kind option of the endogenous incomplete contract. The consumer's kindness
to H is •v
ch > 0 when he makes a contribution and it is •ch < 0 when he decides
14against that and free rides. To simplify the analysis we assume that individuals
only have a discrete choice of the contribution v they make. It is a ¯xed fraction
of their actual utility: v = ‚u. Furthermore, we assume that being purely self-
interested means ﬁs = 0 and being a fair-minded consumer translates into ﬁf
where ﬁf is large enough that for socially-minded consumers U v
c > Uc always
holds. They prefer to make a contribution v = ‚u. For self-interested consumers
U v
c < Uc is always true and they never contribute.
While endogenous incomplete contracts with contributing consumers can be
regarded as the positive reciprocity equilibrium of the game, a charged price
enforced by ¯ne and ¯le sharing consumers represent the nasty or negative
reciprocity equilibrium. The strategically low price of our model can be regarded
as an option to which consumers are neutral.
In general terms the principal expects to receive v = ﬁ ¢ ‚u when he o®ers
the endogenous incomplete contract to a consumer.
We already mentioned one speci¯c game of Charness and Rabin (2002) that
delivered surprising results and calls into question the prevailing doubts regard-
ing positive reciprocity shown in conventional games studied. Another of their
games, Berk 14, appears to be an even closer ¯t for the simpli¯ed payo®s of our
model and underlines the signi¯cance of positive reciprocity: Player A chooses
between a (800 for A, 0 for B) outcome and giving player B the choice between
outcomes (0, 800) and (400, 400). 55% of the B's make the balanced choice
here, while only 22% of B's choose this option in the controlled version (a pure
dictator game) without a kind ¯rst move of player A.
This supports the intuition of our scenario as modelled above. The principal
has the choice between two outcomes. One gives him the bulk of the surplus
and leaves not much for the agent. The second lets the agent decide between
two options. He can "cheat" and abuse the trust (no payo® for the principal,
everything for the agent) or he can share the bene¯t with the principal by
contributing voluntarily. Following the kind ¯rst move of the principal (he
forgoes trying to enforce a high price) the agent is more likely to return the
kindness and act reciprocally.
Again, transaction costs as in ¯le sharing use do not play a role when the
principalmakes the product freely available on his web site. Thedirect download
from the site of the copyright holder or a licensed intermediary is quick and of
high quality. Naturally, the endogenous incomplete contract does not feature a
price. However, fairness and reciprocity might be regarded as an enforcement
device of the deliberately left open contract. No consumer is deprived of a
potential bene¯t with the price equal to marginal cost. Voluntary contributions
to the principal can exceed his reservation costs and motivate him to o®er his
products for free.
4 Analysis of the market
This section applies the presented contracts to the market for digital music.
154.1 Market Demand
We model the market in a very basic way, similar to Besen and Kirby (1989) or
Yoon (2002). Demand is linear and downward sloping. Consumer's preferences
for music are heterogeneous and their valuations are uniformly distributed over
the interval [0, a]. Consumption is n units per person, there are N potential
music consumers and the maximum quantity of music demanded is q = nN. We
assume d to be strictly less than the price in the copy protection case. Otherwise
strong copy protection is useless to analyse since no protection is necessary to
set the optimal price for the principal. A numerical example will follow later to
illustrate the cases.
The principal wants to maximise pro¯ts and will develop the product if and
only if the revenue in the consumption period covers the ¯xed costs of stage 1.
Naturally, in all contract cases this is the reservation cost R. Additionally the
compliance costs K are incurred in the strong copy protection case.
Remember that any ¯xed costs incurred in stage 1 are sunk in stage 2 and
that marginal costs are zero.
The demand function is: p = a ¡ bq
Assumption 1: K > 0
Assumption 2: d < a
2
4.1.1 Strong Copy Protection
The incentive compatibility constraint of pmon · sf +d restricts the price in the
copy protection case. Moreover, the principal would like to use a monopolistic
pricing policy of pM = a
2 to maximise the pro¯t. The price under strong copy












Figure 1 : Supply and demand under strong copy protection
If the threat of punishment is not a binding condition for the price, then
the principal can set the monopoly price of pM = a
2. He maximises revenue
and his surplus is PSCP = a2
4b. Consumer surplus is CSCP = a2
8b and the usual
deadweight loss results. Some consumers are excluded from consumption due
to a price higher than marginal cost.
If the pro¯t maximising monopoly price pM cannot be enforced, because the
threat of punishment is not strong enough, the principal will have to settle on
pmon at which consumers are indi®erent between buying and downloading. His
surplus would then be P SCP = (sf + d)(a ¡ (sf + d)) 1
b.
4.1.2 Low Price
If the principal decides to compete with copies obtainable in P2P networks, her
price cannot exceed the disutility agents experience from copying:
plow · d
As mentioned before we assume these transaction costs (the virus risk, moral
issues, inconvenience from downloading) to be constant across consumers. Tech-
nically, demand is perfectly elastic at d and it is easy to see that in the monop-
olistic environment for realistically small values of d the pro¯t maximising price
the principal chooses will equal d.
17 
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Figure 2: Supply and demand with a strategically low price
Being forced to set a very low price the pro¯t of the principal shrinks signif-
icantly. Recall however that no compliance costs are incurred. With our linear
demand a price of d results in a revenue of PSlow = d
b(a ¡ d). The consumer
surplus is CSlow = 1
2b(a ¡ d)2. Fewer potential consumers are kept from a
bene¯cial trade than under strong copy protection.
4.1.3 Voluntary Reciprocal Contributions
There is no price charged in the case of endogenous incomplete contracts. Rev-
enue for the principal comes from voluntary contributions by agents. These
payments are determined by the social preferences parameter ‚ and the ratio of
fair-minded consumers ﬁ, but also depend on the actual utility each consumer
gets from listening.
18 







Figure 3: Supply and demand with voluntary contributions
With a price of zero no consumer is excluded from the bene¯t of the prod-
uct. Deadweight loss is eliminated and { at ¯rst { consumers receive the entire
surplus. However a fraction ﬁ of consumers returns ‚ of their utility u to the
copyright holder because of their social preferences. Again, we transform ﬁ
into the probability of each consumer to reciprocate. Voluntary contributions
amount to PSV C =
1
2bﬁ‚a2 and are the principal's revenue. The remaining
consumer surplus is CSV C = a2
2b(1¡ ﬁ‚).
4.2 Analysis of Private Incentives
The principal's revenue and costs determine the private incentives to invest. He
selects the contract design that promises the highest pro¯t.
¦ = P S ¡ R ¡ K
We analyse under which parameter values each contract design maximises
pro¯t. K is replaced with k
b in the calculations.
Two di®erent sub-cases are possible under strong copy protection and we
distinguish between them in the analysis. When the threat of punishment is
strong enough to enforce the monopoly price, we calculate with pM and ¦C P =
( a
2)2
b ¡ R¡K. Alternatively, we use pmon and ¦C P =
(sf+d)(a¡(sf +d))
b ¡R¡ K.
Both sub-cases are considered in order to calculate the conditions for the op-
timality of strong copy protection. These are su±cient conditions. We restrict
the analysis to strong copy protection with a monopoly price when we deter-
mine the optimality conditions of a strategically low price and of voluntary
contributions. These are necessary conditions.
19Proposition 1 When the monopoly price can be charged, strong copy protection
is the optimal choice if and only if d · a
2 ¡
p
k and a ¸
q
4k
(1¡2ﬁ‚) for ﬁ‚ < 1
2.
When the price charged equals the threat of punishment, strong copy pro-















Proof. a) The principal's revenue of strong copy protection is determined
by the monopoly price (pmon ¸ pM):





















The case d ¸ a
2 +
p
k can never occur because of the assumption d < pM.
























If ﬁ‚ ¸ 1
2, then the monopoly surplus is already smaller than the rev-




b ¡ R ¡ K > a2
4b ¡ R = ¦V C cannot hold since K is de¯ned to
be positive). However, the necessary parameter conditions are rather implau-
sible. Every consumer would have to contribute half of his utility. Otherwise,
strong copy protection generates more pro¯t for the principal than the voluntary
contributions case, if a ¸
q
4k
(1¡2ﬁ‚) and ﬁ‚ < 1
2:
b) The principal's revenue of strong copy protection is determined by the
threat of punishment (pmon < pM):
¦C P ¸ ¦low (15)
(sf + d)(a ¡ (sf + d))
b















¦C P ¸ ¦V C (19)
(sf + d)(a ¡ (sf + d))
b




















(1+ 2ﬁ‚)(sf + d)2 + 2ﬁ‚k
ﬁ‚
(22)






in b)) below the monopolistic price to make strong copy protection superior to
the low price design. Moreover, strong copy protection has to generate more
pro¯t than endogenous incomplete contracts. The compliance costs must not be
too high in the case of the monopoly price. In b) the highest possible valuation
of a consumer (a) cannot be toofar above or below the enforceable price (pmon =
sf + d) divided by the reciprocity parameters (ﬁ‚). This distance also depends
on the compliance costs.

















¦low > ¦C P (23)







The case d < a
2 +
p
k is always true because of the assumption d < pM.








2 ¡ 2da + 2d


















¦V C is strictly superior to ¦low, if ﬁ‚ ¸
1
2 because of assumption 2.
21In order for low strategic pricing to be better than strong copy protection
the disutility of copying d has to be less than
p
k below the monopolistic price.
Only then does the revenue from strategic pricing exceed the monopoly pro¯t.
The second condition guarantees that the strategically low price creates better
incentives than the voluntary contributions design.
Proposition 3 Endogenous incomplete contracts to encourage voluntary con-
tributions are optimal (i) if ﬁ‚ ¸ 1
2 or (ii) for ﬁ‚ < 1




























See equations 11 to 14 and explanation in the second half of Proposition 1's
proof a).
¦V C > ¦low (33)
See equations 19 to 23 in the second half of Proposition 2's proof.
The voluntary contributions design is optimal, if ﬁ‚ ¸ 1
2. In this case
no other design can exceed the revenue generated by endogenous incomplete
contracts. Otherwise, it is superior to strong copy protection, if the compliance
costs K are too high. Moreover, it must create a higher pro¯t than under
strategic pricing to make it the optimal contract.
4.3 Social Welfare Analysis
The optimal contract design is the one that maximises social welfare subject to
its revenue from consumption being greater or equal than the costs it causes.
It is straightforward to see from section 4.1 that with voluntary contributions
there is no deadweight loss at all and the costs are not higher than in the
other cases. Since plow < pCP and the demand curve is downward sloping the
deadweight loss with strategic pricing is less than under strong copy protection.
Moreover, ¯xed costs are also strictly lower under strategic pricing.
Although the deadweight loss is minimised under voluntary contributions,
we have to verify, if this contract design creates enough returns for the principal
to make production worthwhile for him. Otherwise, he would decide not to
produce in the ¯rst place.
Proposition 4 The endogenous incomplete contract design is welfare superior
if P SV C = a2ﬁ‚
2b ¸ R
22The generated revenue P SV C has to cover the reservation costs R to make
the voluntary contributions design socially optimal.
Proposition 5 The contract with a strategically low price is welfare superior if
P SV C = a2ﬁ‚
2b < R ·
d(a¡d)
b = P Slow
Setting a strategically low price is socially optimal, if endogenous incomplete
contracts are not pro¯table and R is not higher than the respective revenue
P Slow.
Proposition 6 Strong copy protection is welfare maximising if PSV C =
a2ﬁ‚
2b <
R and PSlow =
d(a¡d)
b < R and
( a
2 )2
b ¸ R + K
If the voluntary contributions and the strategically low price design are not
pro¯table, the reservation and compliance costs must be less than the revenue
P SCP to make strong copy protection welfare superior.
In case none of the contract designs generates enough revenue to exceed its
respective costs, not to produce at all is socially optimal.
We have determined the conditions when each contract design is optimal
for the principal and we know when each one is welfare maximising. As the
¯nal step of our analysis we will check now whether the di®erent objectives are
con°icting.
If Proposition 3 holds and the voluntary contributions design is the most
pro¯table one for H, then we only need to verify if Proposition 4 is ful¯lled. Once
the voluntary contributions revenue exceeds the reservation costs, endogenous
incomplete contracts are optimal from a private and social perspective.
When a strategically low price is optimal as explained in Proposition 2,
we have to check if Proposition 5 holds. We know that PSlow > P SV C, but
there would be a con°ict between private and public interests, if endogenous
incomplete contracts generate enough revenue to cover the reservation costs.
The principal wants to set a strategically low price, but that is not the optimal
contract design from a social point of view.
We have a similar con°ict between the private and the public choice in
the case of Proposition 3 when strong copy protection is most pro¯table for
the principal. Proposition 6 has to hold to align the interests. However, if
either the revenue from voluntary contributions or from a strategically low price
exceeds the reservation costs of the principal, his choice of strong copy protection
maximises his pro¯t but not social welfare.
Generally, con°icts between the private and the public perspective arise
when voluntary contributions (or the revenue from a strategically low price)
cover the reservation costs of the principal, but his pro¯t is greater with another
contract design (under strong copy protection). In these cases the principal
chooses a contract that creates a high deadweight loss even though another
contract would exceed his costs as well and would be welfare superior. From a
public point of view it would then make sense to intervene by making socially
e±cient contracts more attractive to principals.
234.4 Numerical Example
Our numerical example of the market for music uses data suggested in Romer
(2002). The worldwide revenue in the industry has been roughly $40 billion
over the last decade. This has been mainly generated by the sale of albums
on CDs. Singles played a minor role in the traditional music industry, but
they appear to be the most popular unit online: Usually individual songs are
downloaded instead of the entire album. Therefore, we use singles to model the
world demand for music. The retail price for singles in the USA is approximately
$4 and we calculate with a marginal cost of $2 of the CD single. A demand
curve that starts with a highest valuation of a = $6 and slopes downwards with
b = ¡
1
5000000 results in an equilibrium price pM = $4 and equilibrium quantity
for CD music of 10 billion units (expressed in single songs). Overall, there is
demand for music of 30 billion units. While this data is very rough and the
estimations are not claimed to be precise, it should give a good approximate
idea of the market structure.
It also explains the existence of P2P ¯le sharing alongside a stagnant but
by no means imploding market for traditional and online music. The demand
for 20 billion songs per year that is excluded by the monopolistic price setting
of the industry (to the right of qM = 10B and below pM = $4) is met by ¯le
sharing. Romer (2002) assumes 18 billion tracks downloaded in 2001. More
recent papers use sources from the end of 2003 with 1 billion downloads per
week (Oberholzer and Strumpf (2004)), which adds up to 50 billion a year.
That suggests a demand curve that is even °atter to the right of qM (or in
general).
We now apply this market demand curve to our three contract cases for
digital goods (no marginal costs). That leads to a monopolistic price in the
strong copy protection case of pM = $3. The condition for this is to be able
to enforce the price using the threat of prosecution or implementing a secure
system altogether. Early online services with strict digital rights management
tried to charge high prices, but failed miserably to attract demand and copying
continued. If this price level cannot be enforced by monitoring and suing ¯le
sharing consumers, the principal has to settle for a lower price that can be
enforced. We assume pmon = d + $1. Successful recent online music ventures
like Apple's iTunes set a price of 99 cent. They are increasingly popular and it
seems a signi¯cant amount of consumers prefers high convenience music17 for
this price to ¯le sharing music `for free'. However, it must be mentioned that
they only seem popular compared to previous online music ventures. Their sales
numbers are still tiny in contrast to ¯le sharing. Thus, we assume the disutility
of copying d to be equal to $1.18 Finally, based on the corresponding literature
we assume the ratio of voluntary contributions ﬁ‚ to be 20%. This means 60%
of consumers are purely self-interested and never contribute. The remaining
17Files can be saved on up to ¯ve di®erent computers and unlimited CDs can be burned.
This stands in sharp contrast to earlier online music platforms of the industry that were very
restrictive.
18In reality it might be even less and plow might drop in the future.
2440% give half of their utility of consumption as a voluntary contribution.
This results in producer surpluses of P SCP = $45B ($40B respectively with
pmon), P Slow = $25B and PSV C = $18B for the respective contract cases. That
means the copyright holder could have very high compliance costs to monitor
and enforce the monopolistic price and still copy protection would be most
pro¯table.
The compliance costs K necessary to maintain strong copy protection are
clearly di±cult to estimate. We use calculations from Eckersley (2003) for the
cost of a trusted system of digital rights management. Employment of a so-called
4758 cryptographic co-processor can be regarded as a bullet proof protection.
It has been developed by IBM and with some more R&D its retail price can be
brought down to $100. Each music device would be required to have one such
card installed for the protection to work. If we assume that each music consumer
uses only one device, we can derive the one-o® compliance costs that have to
be invested (we do not consider future maintenance and upgrading costs of the
system here). Under monopoly conditions demand for music is qM = 15B. U.S.
music sales usually make up one third of world sales. The U.S. population over
12 that is normally considered for U.S. consumer statistics is 200 million people.
A conservative guess is that 50% of them buy music at the monopoly price. The
world demand for music is then met with a reasonable estimate of an average
consumption of 50 songs and 300 million music consumers worldwide (at the
monopoly price). This will cause compliance costs K = $100¢300M = $30B to
build a trusted system for music consumption.
4.5 Dynamic Process
An important issue to consider is whether a su±cient level of voluntary contri-
butions can be maintained over time. Will contributions for the next product
releases increase or decrease, when consumers see the artist received not enough
or way su±cient support?
The question of a long-term equilibrium for voluntary contributions is anal-
ysed in public goods games. Lab experiments are conducted where subjects are
confronted with a public goods situation: They can privately contribute part of
or their entire endowment for the production of an e±cient public good, while
the payo® for each subject is simply an equally big piece of the total pie. Indi-
vidual self-interest is at odds with the social optimum and conventional game
theory predicts that no one contributes { the strong free rider equilibrium { in
sharp contrast to the Pareto-e±cient allocation where everybody contributes.
This is known as the public goods problem. (Ledyard (1995))
The ¯ndings of many standard experiments are that rates of contribution
are initially around 50%, but go steadily down over time. Extra features as in
Cadsby and Maynes (1999) improve contribution rates and can make subjects
converge to the group interest equilibrium: Continuous instead of binary con-
tributions, a money-back guarantee if the threshold is not reached, lowering the
threshold and increasing the reward of contributing. Also Menezes et al. (2001)
conclude the superiority of a money-back guarantee.
25It appears that a sustainable level of contributions can be maintained when
the proper design is used.
5 Conclusion
The paper aims to integrate the peculiarities of digital information into the so-
cial preferences framework. A model based on incomplete contracts theory is
presented. It provides an alternative way to o®er digital information goods {
potentially more e±cient we conclude. With endogenous incomplete contracts
welfare is maximised and incentives to invest may be su±cient, while complete
contracts charge a price above marginal costs and a deadweight loss is inevitable.
As a policy implication this result ought to be considered for the contract de-
sign of digital content. In particular, the strategically low price or the voluntary
contributions design might exceed the reservation costs of the principal, but he
opts for another { welfare inferior { contract that maximises his pro¯t. Incen-
tives to make socially e±cient contracts more attractive to principals appear to
be a reasonable policy in this case.
In the broader context of the principal agent model three di®erent contract
designs are analysed: Strong copy protection, a strategically low price and vol-
untary contributions. We ¯nd that any of them can be the most pro¯table
information goods contract for the principal. However, only the endogenous
incomplete contract that encourages voluntary contributions maximises social
welfare { as long as the reservation costs of the principal are covered.
The success of endogenous incomplete contracts in the context of music likely
depends on whether designs can be developed that implement mutual opportu-
nities to reciprocate. The integration of a bonus like in Fehr, Klein and Schmidt
(2001) makes the contract even more incomplete and thus leaves more room for
reciprocity (from both sides). A bonus in the context of the music business
could be exclusive access to concerts or backstage and special merchandising for
consumers who did contribute. The implementation of reputation mechanisms
is another feature that could support voluntary contributions. It is also possible
to imagine designs that remind consumers to make their voluntary contribution
in case they do enjoy the music. The freely available music ¯le expires after
a certain time (e.g. a month) or after a certain number of times played and
then the consumer can decide how much to contribute. He owns the ¯le if he
does, while the ¯le disappears if he fails to. He could download it once again,
but the disutility of doing that repeatedly seems to be substantial. This soft
enforcement of a contribution is common for shareware software and it has the
advantage that a payment decision is postponed to a time when the consumer's
valuation of the experience good is clearer.
The sequence of actions could also be altered. It might be reasonable for
the copyright holder to distribute a preliminary sample of the work, ask for a
pre-payment, deliver the whole album (if the pre-payment was large enough)
and encourage voluntary contributions. Moreover, the question of a long-term
positive reciprocity equilibrium has to be analysed, which has only been outlined
26in this paper.
Another important question is, who the copyright holder actually is. Is it the
record label like in the traditional music industry or the artist? The implications
on the potential fair behaviour of agents (an impersonal market trade between
consumer and company or a social personal exchange between consumers and
their artists) and also on the de¯nition of the reservation costs are signi¯cant.
Related research on the e±cient ownership structure in the music industry like
Clemons and Lang (2003) and Regner (2003) points out that label ownership of
music copyright becomes less likely in the digital age. It also matters whether
the artist is already "rich and famous" or if he or she is just starting. Voluntary
contributions are probably more likely to be given to newcomer artists than to
millionaire pop stars based on behaviour motivated by inequity aversion.19
Eventually, it willbe up to the market forces to determine for which principal
strong copy protection, strategically low pricing or the voluntary contributions
design is best suited and when.
The paper opens up an interesting ¯eld for future research. Modi¯ed exper-
iments to test for social preferences in digital age contexts would be a logical
next step. Moreover, it needs to be investigated in more detail when endogenous
incomplete contracts for information goods are successful and how they have to
be designed.
19However, one example of an artist that has chosen a voluntary contributions design is
clearly of the "rich and famous" type: George Michael. See BBC (2004).
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